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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the consequences of debt policies on the spatial distribution of 
output in a two-country model. It departs from the usual set up of local public finance 
by relaxing the assumption of balanced budget. Further, to single out the pure effect 
of debt the paper eliminates effects coming from tax and expenditure policies by 
assuming them exogenous and identical between countries except for the timing of 
taxation. Expected taxation rather than current tax levels motivates migration. Starting 
from an initial spatial configuration, be it Core-Periphery or symmetric equilibrium, 
the analysis identifies the critical thresholds of divergence or convergence of debt 
ratios which break the initial configuration. The paper also shows that a high debt 
country or a fast debt reducing country is a weaker player in the tax competition 
game. Lastly, tax harmonisation does not necessarily reduce migration flows.  
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1. Introduction. 
The scope of this paper is to study the consequences of debt policies on the 
spatial distribution of economic activity and to outline some implications concerning 
tax competition. Like most of the literature on local public finance, this paper allows 
for migration of factors but, unlike most of that literature, I relax the assumption of 
government balanced budget at all times. Migration is driven by the intertemporal 
profile of taxation resulting from debt policy rather than by the current tax rates 
differential. Migration of factors has temporary or permanent consequences on the 
spatial distribution of economic activity depending on the level of economic 
integration and on governing debt policy. To understand the key mechanism driving 
migration, consider the following simplified thought experiment. Assume two 
identical countries that have exactly the same current tax rates and whose government 
budget initially balances. Now assume that one government creates public debt 
temporarily by reducing taxation “today” and increasing it in the “future” consistently 
with its intertemporal budget constraint. The discounted value of taxation “today” is 
unchanged. This seemingly neutral policy induces migration away from the 
temporarily indebted country. The reason is that by migrating between today and the 
future the migrant enjoys the tax reduction today and avoids the tax increase in the 
future. This motive for migration is absent from the literature on local public finance 
and is the objective of investigation in the present paper.  
Two types of debt policies are analysed: temporary debt divergence (as in the 
example above) and debt convergence. Four major results emerge from this analysis. 
First, temporary debt divergence may destabilise the initial spatial configuration. 
Secondly, and perhaps more surprisingly, a policy of debt convergence is also likely 
to destabilise the initial spatial configuration. Thirdly, the ability of a country to 
engage in international tax competition is weakened by the debt overhang. Fourthly, a 
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policy of debt convergence makes the debt reducing country a stronger player in the 
tax the competition game in the long run but makes it a weaker player in the short run.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I review the 
related literature; in section 3 I present the model; in section I 4 present a simple case; 
in section 5 and 6 I study, respectively, the effects of temporary debt divergence and 
debt convergence starting from an initial symmetric equilibrium; in section 7 I study 
the effects of debt converge and debt divergence starting from an agglomerated 
equilibrium; and section 8 I discusses the consequences of debt policies on tax 
competition. In the Appendix I discuss the case of perfect foresight. 
 
2. Relationship to the literature 
The study of the effect of debt policies on the location of economic activity is 
practically absent from the literature on local public finance. The closest relationship I 
have found is with the works on economic geography and public policies. Works in 
this area revisit some aspects of public policy in the light of new economic geography 
models though public debt is absent: Ludema and Wooton (2000) show that economic 
integration may result in a decline rather than in an increase of tax competition; Kind 
et al. (2000) highlight the complexity of the implications of economic integration on 
tax competition: Baldwin and Krugman (2004) find that economic integration results 
in an initial increase in the tax gap and subsequently in a decline as trade costs are 
reduced further: Brülhart, M., M. Jametti, and K. Schmidheiny (2012) find evidence 
that, consistently with theory, agglomeration economies attenuate the impact of tax 
differentials on firms location choices; Anderson and Forslid (2003) consider a model 
where amenities enter the utility function and have shown that, other things equal, a 
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symmetric increase in taxation destabilises the symmetric equilibrium. An insightful 
discussion of this literature and other related works is in Baldwin et al. (2003). 
Like these papers, I use a model of economic geography. Specifically, I use a 
simple extension of Krugman’s (1991a) “Core-Periphery” model. This choice is 
justified by the fact that the “Core-Periphery” model is built on a simple structure but 
has all the features required for the purpose of my study, namely: migration of factors, 
agglomeration and dispersion forces, multiple equilibria. These three elements are all 
essential for the story I want to tell. There are some variants to the structure of the 
Core-Periphery model that could be used as well. These variants concern in particular 
the expectation regime (Baldwin, 2001) and the assumption of factor specificity 
(Ottaviano, 2001; Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003). Utilising any one of these variants 
would not affect the results. In the Appendix I will use Baldwin’s (2001) extension of 
Krugman (1991a) to discuss the case of perfect foresight.  
I depart from the literature above and from the typical models of local public 
finance by relaxing the flow balanced budget constraint and replace it with the 
interpemporal budget constraint. Most of the local public finance literature assumes 
that the government budget balances at any time. This assumption is as much 
convenient as it is at odds with reality. In reality, governments are not in balanced 
budget and public debt is far from zero. I take account of this basic fact in extending 
the Core-Periphery model. I assume that governments’ debt policies are exogenous. 
This seems a reasonable choice since debt policies are more often motivated by 
macroeconomic considerations than by economic geography. Thus, in the model 
governments do not use debt policies in order to influence the spatial configuration of 
economic activity. Nevertheless, debt policies have consequences for the spatial 
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configuration of economic activity through factor migration. The consequence of 
these policies is what is being studied in this paper.  
The link between debt and migration was first recognised by David Ricardo 
(1817) in his famous Principles but to date has remained vastly unexplored. I will 
return to Ricardo’s thought in the next paragraph after having noted that, to my 
knowledge, only a tiny literature in local public finance has studied the link between 
debt and migration in modern times. Daly (1969), Oates (1972), and Wellisch and 
Richter (1995) take account of the link between debt and migration in their models 
but their focus is different from the one in the present paper. Their objective is to 
explore the incidence of different modes of financing local public infrastructure 
(Daly, 1969; Oates, 1972) and to study the debt policy that maximises the welfare of 
local residents (Wellisch and Richter, 1995). Furthermore, their set up is that of a 
small country partial equilibrium model. The present paper takes a different focus and 
uses a different model structure: the focus is on the consequences of debt policies on 
the spatial distribution of economic activity; the model structure is that of a two-
country general equilibrium model that exhibits agglomeration and dispersion forces.  
I conclude this section by returning to Ricardo’s view on the link between debt 
and migration. The clarity of his thoughts and beauty of his prose make it irresistible 
to quote him verbatim. Here is what he writes (Principles, p. 247; italics added):  
“A country which has accumulated a large debt, is placed in a most 
artificial situation; and although the amount of taxes, and the increased 
price of labour, may not, and I believe does not, place it under any other 
disadvantage with respect to foreign countries, except the unavoidable one 
of paying those taxes, yet it becomes the interest of every contributor to 
withdraw his shoulder from the burthen, and to shift this payment from 
himself to another; and the temptation to remove himself and his capital to 
another country, where he will be exempted from such burthens, becomes 
at last irresistible, and overcomes the natural reluctance which every man 
feels to quit the place of his birth, and the scene of his early associations.” 
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The model in this paper, among other things, gives formal shape to the 
intuition of the great economist. 
 
3. The Model. 
The structure of the model follows closely Krugman’s (1991a) Core-Periphery 
model but augments it with a government sector and with forward looking 
individuals. The world is composed of two countries (H and F) and is populated by 
infinitely lived individuals that appeared on earth at time z = 0 by fiat people.1 The 
world population is normalised to 1 and is composed of two types of individuals who 
also are the only two factors of production: skilled and unskilled labour. These two 
factors are available in given quantities: there are μ skilled workers and 1-μ unskilled. 
Unskilled labour is assumed to be internationally immobile and, for the sake of 
symmetry, I assume that each country hosts (1-μ)/2 unskilled workers. Skilled labour 
may migrate.2 The state variable ( )ziλ  denotes country i’s share of skilled labour at 
time z. This share may change over time if migration occurs. Obviously, 
( ) ( )zz FH λλ −= 1 . I have assumed that the migration decision is taken by skilled 
labour. Alternatively, one may assume that the migration decision is taken by firms. It 
is well known, however, that in models of this class it is immaterial whether the 
migration decision is taken by firms or by labour; results are identical. The 
isomorphism among various models of this class with respect to the migration 
decision (and other aspects) is demonstrated in Robert-Nicoud (2005).  
                                                 
1 The term “country” in this paper is used as a generic label for any political unit which is entitled to 
issue bonds and to tax its residents; it can be interpreted, for instance, as states within the United States, 
provinces within Canada, or countries within Europe. 
2 The assumption that skilled labour is internationally mobile while unskilled labour is not is made for 
pure convenience but it reflects some empirical evidence on migration flows; see, for instance, Shields 
and Shields (1989). 
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There are two goods being produced: a homogenous good A and a horizontally 
differentiated good M. Unskilled labour is the only input in the production of A and 
skilled labour is the only input in the production of M. Nominal wages of unskilled 
and skilled workers in country i are denoted with wAi and wMi, respectively. As usual 
in this class of models, good A is traded at zero cost while the differentiated good is 
traded internationally at an iceberg type of trade cost: for each unit shipped only a 
fraction ]1,0(∈ψ  arrives at its destination. One unit of unskilled labour produces one 
unit of good A. Perfect competition in sector A equalises the price of A to the wage of 
unskilled workers. The input of skilled labour for q units of output of any variety of M 
is f+aq. Denoting with σ both the perceived elasticity of demand and the elasticity of 
substitution among varieties and using the normalisations f=1/σ and a=σ/(σ-1), the 
optimal output per firm equals 1 and the profit maximising prices for sales at home 
and abroad are pii=wMi and pij=wMi/ψ, respectively. The number of varieties of M 
produced in the world (which is endogenous) is constant and, using the 
normalisations, it is equal to 1. The number of varieties produced in country i is 
denoted in . Using the normalisations, I have that iin λ=  at any time. Given the utility 
function specified below, both countries produce the homogeneous good as long as μ 
< 1/2. I assume this inequality throughout the paper so that the price of A is the same 
in both countries. Good A will be used as the numéraire good and its price is set equal 
to 1. 
Governments are assumed to be identical in all respects except for the debt 
policy. Government expenditure is assumed to be a constant proportion of gross 
domestic product. Since this proportion does not play any role, it is convenient to save 
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notation by assuming it to be zero in both countries at any time.3 It is assumed that 
government of country F keeps the debt to a constant level (zero for simplicity). Since 
government expenditure is zero it follows that taxation is also zero for all individuals 
in country F. Government of country H, instead, operates an intertemporal 
reallocation of taxes which is consistent with its intertemporal budget constraitn. Total 
tax revenues in country H, denoted ( )zTH , is collected from the skilled and unskilled 
labour according to the following proportions: a proportion µϕλH=Φ  of total tax 
revenues is collected from skilled labour and the remaining Φ−1  is collected from 
unskilled labour. The parameterϕ , which represents the tax distribution criterion, can 
take any value in the set ),0( 1−µ . As a consequence, Φ  will range in the set [0,1). In 
particular, we have 0=Φ  only if 0=Hλ . This means that the only constraint 
imposed upon the tax distribution criterion is that as long as both factors are present in 
the country they are both taxed.4 The resulting per capita taxation for unskilled and 
skilled labour in country H is ( ) )1/()1(2)(1 µ−Φ−= zTzt HA  and 
( ) µλHHM zTzt /)(1 Φ= , respectively. Finally, government budgetary policies obey the 
following flow constraint and transversality condition: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0=+−
•
zTzBzrzB H        (1) 
( ) ( ) 0exp =





∫∞→
s
z
s
drzBLim ζζ .       (2) 
where B(z) is government debt at time z and the “dot” denotes the time derivative. 
Given the subjective rate of time preference ρ  and defining µµ −= 1)( AMzc , 
                                                 
3 The consequences of government expenditure on the spatial configuration of economic activity in a 
similar model have been studied theoretically and empirically in Trionfetti (2001) and in Brülhart and 
Trionfetti (2004). 
 8 
individuals maximize ∫
∞
=
−−
zs
zs dsesc )()( ρ , subject to the transversality condition and to 
the flow constraint )()()()( zzdzkzrk sisisisi ε−+=
•
, where ksi(z) denotes the stock of 
financial assets accumulated by an individual in i, )(zsiε  denotes the individual 
expenditure, and dsi(z)=wsi(z)-tsi(z) is individual disposable income. Since there may 
be migration, to recover aggregate values from (optimised) individual variables I 
index immigrants by their vintage ξ  of arrival in their new country of residence. 
Thus, aggregate variables in i (denoted by upper case letters) can be computed by use 
of the general aggregation function (3): 
ξξξµλµ ∫−+
−
=
z
ijjiiii dmzgxzxzX
0
)(),()0()0()(
2
1)(    (3) 
where mij(z) is the flow of migrants from i to j at time z, and ),( zg j ξ  is the value of 
the variable associated with the individual that migrated to j at time ξ  as of time z. 
World aggregates are denoted by upper case letters without any subscripts and can be 
easily computed using the aggregation function (3). Thus, ( )zD , ( )zK , ( )zE , and 
( )zY  denote respectively aggregate disposable income, aggregate stock of financial 
assets, aggregate expenditure, and aggregate output in the world economy. The 
aggregate expenditure dynamics and the aggregate resource constraint are given by: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]zHzDzrzE +−=
•
ρ ,      (4) 
 ( ) ( ) ApnpnzEzY FFFHHH ++== .      (5) 
This model excludes physical capital accumulation. Therefore, expenditure jumps 
immediately to its steady state value. Further, since aggregate world income Y is 
                                                                                                                                            
4 This assumption is slightly less restrictive than those used in the related literature. For instance 
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) assume Φ = ½ while Ludema and Wooton (2000) and Kind et al. (2000) 
assume that only the mobile factor is taxed (Φ = 1). 
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constant, aggregate world expenditure must be constant too, which implies that the 
interest rate is constantly equal to the subjective discount rate, i.e., r = ρ.  
The market equilibrium equations for the varieties of M are: 
 
( ) ( ) MHMFHMHH
FMH
MFHMHH
HMH w
ww
Yw
ww
Yw
=
−+
+
−+ −−−
−−
−−−
−
σσσ
σσ
σσσ
σ
λψλ
ψ
λψλ 111
11
111
1
11
,  (6) 
( ) ( ) MFMFHMHH
FMF
MFHMH
HMF w
ww
Yw
ww
Yw
=
−+
+
−+ −−−
−
−−−
−−
σσσ
σ
σσσ
σσ
λψλλψλ
ψ
111
1
111
11
11
.  (7) 
By Walras’ law, the market equilibrium conditions for A are redundant. Equations (6) 
and (7) determine implicitly the wage rate in each country as a function of the 
distribution of skilled labour between countries; these functions are ( ))(zw HMH λ  and 
( ))(zw HMF λ . Skilled labour migrates according to the present value of the indirect 
utility differential between countries. If a skilled worker stays in country i for the rest 
of her (infinite) life, the discounted value at time z of her indirect utility - denoted 
vMi(z) - is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫
∞
−−





 −
≡
z
zs
i
MiMi
Mi dsesP
stswzv ρµ)]([
,     (8) 
where Pi is the CES price index of M implied by the utility function. Skilled workers, 
however, may migrate. The benefit of migrating to country j is the present value of the 
indirect utility differential between countries, which is:  
)()()( zvzvzv MiMjij −≡        (9) 
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I follow Baldwin (2001) in assuming that moving costs take the form 
FH
H
λλ
λγ
•
, where 
γ  is a positive constant.5 Equating the value of migration to moving costs at any time 
gives the differential equation that governs the dynamics of the model: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )zvzzz HFH γ
λλ
λ 21−=
•
.      (10) 
Most of the new economic geography literature has used the assumption of 
static expectations.6 In the main text of this paper I assume that individuals formulate 
rational expectations under imperfect information about future values of prices and 
wages. This will enable an easier comparison between the results in this paper and 
those in the related literature. Further, it will allow us to concentrate on the key 
economic mechanism at work.  
It is important to bear in mind, however, that assuming perfect foresight (i.e., 
rational expectations and perfect information) does not change the essence of the 
results. This is formally demonstrated in the Appendix. 
Assuming for the time being rational expectations and imperfect information, 
the expectation regime is as follows: individuals do not have information as to the 
future values of wages and prices. That is, they ignore the implicit functions 
( ))(zw HMH λ  and ( ))(zw HMF λ , as well as )(zPH  and )(zPF . Therefore, they use 
current wages as best predictors of future wages and they update their prediction 
every instant as current wages evolve over time. Yet, they are aware of the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint and they use this information to 
                                                 
5 Any form of moving costs that gives rise to a differential equation ( ) ( )( )zvfz HFH −=
•
λ , where f 
is a sign preserving function and f(0)=0, can be used without affecting the results. The specification in 
the text is analytically convenient and can be thought intuitively as a queuing system with random 
selection. For its microfoundations see Baldwin (2001). 
6 The only exceptions, besides Krugman (1991b), are Baldwin (2001) and Ottaviano (2001).  
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formulate expectations on future tax liabilities. With these assumptions the expected 
value of )(zMiν is: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )∫
∞
−−





 −
=Ε
z
zs
i
MiMi
i dsezP
stzwzv ρµ)]([
,      (11) 
where Ε  is the expectations operator. The assumption about imperfect information on 
future wages, while not unrealistic, is unsatisfactory from the conceptual point of 
view. This is why in the Appendix I remove this restrictive assumption and show that 
the essence of the result shown in the main text of the paper does not change when I 
assume perfect foresight (i.e., rational expectations and perfect information). In 
particular, all the propositions in this paper remain valid. For expositional purposes, 
however, it seemed more insightful to keep the main text of this paper as close as 
possible to the related literature. This expositional choice should make it easier to 
understand the key economic mechanism in the model.  
Lastly, I assume that the migration process is anonymous; at any point in time 
there are ( )zH
•
λ  “tickets” available to country F and migrants are chosen randomly. 
Since individuals are identical, the anonymity of the migration process is irrelevant 
for the results. 
 
4. Temporary debt divergence and migration: understanding the key 
mechanism. 
It is convenient to begin the analysis of the debt policy by assuming zero trade 
costs. In the absence of trade costs there are neither agglomeration nor dispersion 
forces. The absence of these forces will allow us to focus on the relation between debt 
and migration. Trade costs will be resumed in the next section.  
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Consider two countries which differ only in the tax profile of taxation. 
Precisely, government debt is initially zero in both countries; government F keeps its 
budget balanced at any time while government H creates public debt temporarily by 
undertaking an intertemporal reallocation of taxes. More precisely, government H 
unexpectedly reduces tax collection by an amount equal to α at time z0 and increases it 
by an amount equal to β at time z1.7 So, that the only difference between countries is 
in the time profile of taxation. Note that z0 and z1 are points in time, they are instants. 
Therefore, per capita taxation is identical between countries at all times except in the 
two instants z0 and at z1. Mathematically, this tax profile is obtained by specifying 
TH(z) as a linear combination of two Dirac functions which impart a tax impulse equal 
to α at time z0 and equal to β at time z1. The use of Dirac functions allows us to keep 
per capita taxation the same in both countries at all times except at z0 and z1. In this 
way migration is triggered solely be the intertemporal tax reallocation and not by 
current differences in tax rates. Using equations (1) and (2) I obtain the value of β  
consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, this is: 
)( 01 zzre −−= αβ .8 Individuals foresee the tax increase represented by β  awaiting them 
at z1. Skilled labour can avoid the tax increase by migrating to country F before z1. 
Using (11) and (9) the expression for the benefit of moving to country F is given by:9  
( )
( ) ( )



≥∀<∀
∈∀>−
=
−−−
10
10
,0
),[0101
zzandzz
zzzee
zv
zzrzzr
HF
ϕα
 (12)  
                                                 
7 Residents of country H, unlike residents of country F, have their consumption path disrupted by the 
unexpected tax reduction. They will therefore buy government H’s bonds as they need them for 
consumption smoothing. 
8 The use of Dirac functions turns out to be useful analytically in that the Fourier transform of a Dirac, 
which we encounter in the integration of (1) subject to (2), is an exponential function. 
9 Note that, after substituting TH(z) into tMH(z), expression (11)  is a linear combination of Fourier 
transforms of the Dirac functions constituting TH(z). 
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Expression (12) shows that between z0 and z1 a skilled worker in country H benefit 
from moving to country F. He has the opportunity to avoid paying the taxes that will 
be levied at z1 to reduce the debt. In Ricardo’s words, he will be able “to withdraw his 
shoulder from the burthen, and to shift this payment from himself to another”. 
Precisely, by migrating he will save ( ) ( ) 0101 >− −−− zzrzzr eeϕα  and this burden will fall 
on those who remain in country H.  The term ( )01 zzre −−ϕα  is the increase in taxation 
waiting for any skilled worker at z1. Multiplying it by the discount factor ( )zzre −− 1  
gives us the impact on the indirect utility differential at any z. Apart from the tax 
distribution parameter φ, the present value of future tax liabilities equals the current 
size of public debt; indeed ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )zBeee zzrzzrzzr == −−−− 0101 αα .  
Migration is governed by differential equation (10) where νHF(z) is given by 
(12). The amount of skilled labour that will have migrated to country F at z1 depends 
on the migration cost (γ); on the size of the initial tax reduction (α); on the tax 
distribution parameter (φ); and on the time length between the tax cut and the tax 
increase (z1-z0).  
It is interesting to contrast the temporary nature of the debt policy with the 
permanent effect on migration. The intertemporal reallocation of taxes creates only a 
temporary divergence of the debt ratio between countries; indeed, after z1 debt is zero 
in both countries. Yet, this temporary divergence of debt ratios has permanent 
consequences on the international distribution of the mobile factor. The reason is that 
after z1, there is no point in migrating in either direction since νHF(z) = 0 forever. So, 
the skilled labour that has migrated will stay put, and the spatial configuration of 
economic activity will have permanently changed.  
It is important to recall once more that migration is triggered solely by the 
intertemporal tax reallocation and not by differences in tax levels; tax levels are 
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identical between countries at any time except at z0 and at z1. This is interesting 
because it shows that simply removing the assumption of balanced budget reveals a 
new motive for migration which is absent in balanced budget models.  
There is an implication of this analysis for the tax harmonisation debate that is 
worth pointing out: the harmonisation of current tax rates without the convergence of 
debt ratios (future tax liabilities) does not necessarily reduce migration of the tax base. 
 
5. Temporary Debt Divergence, Temporary Spatial Fluctuations and 
Agglomeration. 
I now reintroduce trade costs to the model. Introducing trade costs generates 
agglomeration and dispersion forces that make the real and nominal wage of skilled 
workers depend on their geographical distribution. Therefore, migration does not stop 
when the debt ratios are again zero in both countries (i.e., at z1). The direction of 
migration after z1 depends on whether agglomeration or dispersion forces dominate 
the dynamics of the model at z1. This, in turn, depends on the geographical 
distribution of skilled labour at z1. To illustrate the mechanism, consider again an 
initial situation where government debt is zero in both countries. Government F keeps 
its budget balanced at any time. Government H follows the same debt policy as in the 
previous section: it generates public debt temporarily, between z0 and z1. Denoting the 
real wages of skilled workers µω FMFF Pw /≡ , 
µω HMHH Pw /≡  , defining the real 
wage differential between country F and country H as HF ωωω −≡ , using (1), (2), 
(9) and (11) I have the following piecewise expression for the benefit of migrating to 
country F: 
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( )
( )






≥∀<∀
∈∀−
=
−
10
10
,1
),[1 0
zzandzz
r
zzze
rzv
zzr
HF
ω
ϕαω
 , (13)  
The first term in the upper line of (13) is the real wage differential and the second 
term is the expected tax increase at z1 discounted to time z. Skilled labour in country 
H can avoid the burden of debt repayment by migrating to country F before z1. 
Migration is governed by differential equation (10) where νHF(z) is given by (13). At 
z0 the term ( )ωr/1  is equal to zero. Migration is triggered at z0 by the term 
( )0zzre −−ϕα  which, instead, is positive. From z1 onward expected tax liabilities are 
zero in both countries but migration continues until real wages are equalised or until 
the mobile factor is all in one country. The long run spatial configuration is 
determined by the size of trade costs, the size of migration costs and the size and 
timing of debt policy. I shall assume a level of trade costs such that gives rise to 
multiple stable spatial configurations. This is the most interesting case for the analysis 
I want to perform. The case of a unique stable and unique unstable spatial 
configuration can be easily understood once the case of multiple stable spatial 
configurations has been studied.10 Figure 1 shows the phase diagram of the 
differential equation (10) when trade costs give rise to multiple stable spatial 
configurations. The solid line represents the phase line before z0 and after z1.11 So, 
before z0 and after z1 there are three internal equilibria, each at the intersection of the 
phase line with the horizontal axis. Henceforth, I will refer to the equilibrium in the 
                                                 
10 In focusing on the most interesting case I follow a widely used expositional strategy. For instance, 
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) concentrate on the Core-Periphery outcome, Ludema and Wooton 
(2000) modify the model in order to eliminate the possibility of multiple stable configurations, and 
Anderson and Forslid (2003) focus on the stability of the symmetric spatial configuration. 
11 The system (8) and (9) cannot be solved explicitly for ω(λH). Therefore, I approximate ω(λH) with a 
continuous polynomial. I use Chebyshev’s approximation method instead of Lagrange as the former 
performs remarkably better (see Judd, 1998). The approximation has been computed for the following 
parameter values: μ = 0.4, σ = 3, ψ = 0.15. 
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middle as the Central spatial configuration (λC) and I will refer to the two lateral 
equilibria as the Left and the Right spatial configuration (λL, and λR).  
Figure 1 
The spatial effects of temporary debt divergence: phase lines. 
 
Inspection of the phase line gives the stability properties of the equilibria. Note that 
the phase line in Figure 1 has sign reversed with respect to the phase line appearing, 
for instance, in Krugman (1991) or in Baldwin (2001) or Baldwin et al. (2003). This is 
so because I have found more intuitive to define νHF(z) as the benefit of migrating to 
country F and I have accordingly defined ω  as HF ωωω −≡ . Taking account of this 
sign reversion, in the present paper a positively sloped intersection of the phase line 
with the horizontal axis implies a stable equilibrium and a negatively-sloped 
intersection indicates an unstable equilibrium. Figure 1 shows that the Central 
configuration is stable while the lateral configurations are unstable. There are two 
more stable spatial configurations known as the “Core-Periphery” configurations, 
these are:  λH = 0 and λH = 1. In the former (λH = 0) country F is the Core, in the latter 
(λH = 1) country H is the Core. Assume the economy is in λC at z0. The intertemporal 
reallocation of the tax burden shifts the phase line upward between z0 and z1. 
Consequently, the equilibria λL, and λC approach each other and might eventually 
disappear if the phase line shifts up enough (like the dashed line in Figure 1). At z1, 
the phase line drops to its initial position. From z1 onward, the set (λL, λR) is the basin 
0 
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0.2 
- dλ1/dz 
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λ1 
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of attraction of λC and the set (0, λL) is the basin of attraction of the Core-Periphery 
configuration λH = 0. Which of the two spatial configurations will emerge in the long 
run depends on whether at z1 the state variable is in the basin of attraction of λH = 0 or 
of λC. If ( ) ( )Lz λλ ,011 ∈ , then the system will asymptotically approach the Core-
Periphery configuration λH = 0. Conversely, if ( ) ( )CLH z λλλ ,1 ∈ , the system will 
asymptotically return to the central configuration. The value of λH(z1) is smaller the 
smaller are migration costs, the larger is the size of the tax cut, and the longer is the 
time period of debt divergence (z1 – z0). 
Using computer simulations it is possible to find the time path of λH(z) for 
different values of α and γ. Figure 2 illustrates two representative cases. On the 
ordinates I have λH and on the abscissa I have time (z). In both simulations 321 =z  
and 00 =z . The intertemporal rate of time preferences was set at 5%. The dashed line 
represents the case of high migration costs while the dot-dashed line represents the 
case of low migration costs. In the simulations, the values assigned to γ were 1.5 and 
1.2 respectively, thus simulating a 20% drop in migration costs. The value assigned to 
α was –10% of the initial GDP. The distributional parameter ϕ  was set at 8.0=ϕ . 
The solid horizontal line intercepts the vertical axis in correspondence of λL (the same 
value as in Figure 1). With the parameter values chosen for this simulation the two 
lines representing the time paths are visually distinguishable only after z = 20, which 
is where the abscissa starts in the Figure 2. For low migration costs I have 
( ) ( )Lz λλ ,03211 ∈=  (dot-dashed line), therefore, after z1 the system continues on an 
unstable path asymptotically approaching the Core-Periphery configuration. For high 
migration costs I have ( ) ( )RLz λλλ ,3211 ∈= , therefore, after z1 the system 
asymptotically returns to its initial equilibrium (λC). The latter is a case of temporary 
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reconfiguration of economic activity in space. It is as an economic fluctuation in the 
geographical space and I refer to it as to “temporary spatial fluctuation”. Similar 
patterns to those illustrated in Figure 2 would emerge if, keeping migration costs 
constant, I considered large and small α.  
Figure 2 
The spatial effects of temporary debt divergence: time path. 
 
 
The result of this analysis is that a temporary divergence of debt ratios 
generates either a temporary spatial fluctuation or the Core-Periphery outcome. The 
amplitude of the fluctuation and the likelihood of the core periphery configuration 
decrease with γ and increase with α  and 01 zz − . Let divbb ,  denote the maximum 
divergence of debt ratios such that ( )1zHλ  is in the basin of attraction of Cλ . I refer to 
divbb ,  as to the “break-point debt divergence”. A temporary divergence of debt ratios 
beyond the “break-point debt divergence” results in the Core-Periphery configuration. 
The relative size of migration cost, trade costs, tax reduction at z0 and length of the 
existence of the debt, and the interest rate ultimately determine the long run outcome. 
We can summarise the results of this section as follows: 
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Proposition 1. A temporary divergence of debt ratios causes either a temporary 
spatial fluctuation or permanent agglomeration depending on whether the divergence 
of debt ratios has reached a level below or above the “break-point debt divergence”, 
respectively.  
 
This result suggests that a large, albeit temporary, divergence of debt ratios 
may have permanent consequences on the spatial distribution of the mobile factor. 
Even small temporary divergences of debt ratios are not free from insidious 
complications, however. Indeed, if trade costs or migration costs fall during the 
adjustment process, what could initially have been a temporary spatial fluctuation 
might result in permanent agglomeration.  
In the next section I turn to the question of whether the convergence of debt 
ratios may help stabilising the initial spatial configuration. Interestingly, the answer is 
not necessarily positive. 
  
6. Debt Convergence, Temporary spatial fluctuations and Agglomeration. 
 Consider an initial situation of stable but different debt ratios in the two 
countries. Without loss of generality it is assumed that the debt ratio is equal to zero in 
country F and is positive in country H. The intertemporal budget constraint of 
government H requires that taxation be higher in county H due to the need to service 
the debt. This difference in per capita taxation has induced migration in the past, 
which has shifted the central spatial configuration to Cλ′  on the left of ½. It is assumed 
that the economies have already reached the stable spatial configuration Cλ′  when the 
policy of debt convergence is announced. Formally, this means assuming that 
0)(/)( >= bzYzB HH , where b  is a constant and ( ) MHHAHH wwY µλµ +−= 2/)1(  is 
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country H’s GDP. This implies that 0)( =
•
zHλ  for ),( 00 zzz δ−∈ , where 0>δ  and 
δ−0z  is the time at which Hλ  had reached the steady state Cλ′ .
12  Using numerical 
simulations and assigning the values 9.0=b   and 8.0=ϕ  I obtain 
363.0)( 0 ≈′= CH z λλ . At z0 government H announces that it will reduce the debt ratio 
from the current level b  (90% of GDP) to a lower level bb <  by time z1. In the 
simulation I set 6.0=b  (60% of GDP). To achieve this reduction of the debt ratio, 
government H must increase taxation sometime between z0 and z1. The expected 
future tax liability triggers the migration of skilled labour. Using (1), (2), (9) and (11) 
I obtain the following piecewise function: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
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,  (14) 
These expressions can be inspected in conjunction with Figure 3.  
Figure 3 
The spatial effects of debt convergence: phase lines. 
 
 
                                                 
12 To be precise, since the adjustment is asymptotic, δ−0z is the time at which Hλ  was arbitrarily 
close to Cλ′ . 
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The thin line in Figure 3 is the phase line of differential equation (10) at any z before 
the debt reduction is announced; in such case the relevant expression for vHF(z) is 
given in the upper line of (14). Since adjustment has taken place in the past the 
dynamic system is at rest on the central spatial configuration is at 363.0≈′Cλ  where 
the benefit of migrating to country F is zero. At z0 the phase line shifts upward (not 
shown in the figure) because of the jump in the future tax liability represented by the 
third term in the second line of (14). An individual moving to country F before z1 will 
avoid such tax increase. At z1 the phase line drops down and is represented by the 
thick line, which is obtained by substituting the bottom expressions of (14) into 
differential equation (10). At z1 the discounted values of expected future tax liability 
are again zero in both countries but the system is in motion because the value of λH(z1) 
is such that real wages are different between countries. The long run spatial 
configuration depends on whether λH(z1) is in the basin of attraction of the Core-
Periphery or of the central configuration. In the former case the system will 
asymptotically approach the Core-Periphery configuration; in the latter case the 
system will asymptotically approach the central spatial configuration Cλ′  on the thick 
line. The value of λH(z1)  is smaller, the smaller are migration costs and the larger is 
the difference ( )bb − . Using numerical methods it is possible to find the path of λH(z) 
for different values of b  and γ.  
Figure 4 illustrates the cases of high and low migration costs; in the 
simulations the values assigned to γ were 1 and 0.9, thus simulating a 10% drop in 
migration costs. In both cases z1 – z0 = 6. The dashed line represents the time path of 
the state variable in the case of high migration costs (the temporary spatial 
fluctuation) while the dash-dotted line represents the case of small migration costs 
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(the agglomeration case). A similar pattern is obtained by computing high and low b  
respectively.  
Figure 4 
The spatial effects of debt convergence: time path. 
 
Figure 4 represents a general pattern found with simulations: the amplitude of 
the fluctuation increases with the tightness of budgetary convergence (low b ) and 
with the inverse of migration costs (low γ). Let convbb ,  denote the maximum reduction 
of the debt ratio that leaves ( )1zHλ  in the basin of attraction of Cλ  (on the thick line) 
and let refer to it as the “break-point debt convergence”. That is ( )bbMaxb convb −≡,  
such that ( ) ( )RLH z λλλ ,11 ∈ . We can summarise the results of this section as follows. 
 
Proposition 2. Debt convergence generates a temporary spatial fluctuation or 
permanent agglomeration depending on whether the magnitude of debt convergence 
( )bb −  reaches a value below or above the “break-point debt convergence”.  
 
These results suggest that convergence of debt ratios should be pursued with 
caution because it induces migration of the mobile factor and, with it, migration of the 
tax base. A too ambitious budgetary target (low b ) induces larger fluctuations and 
increases the likelihood of agglomeration. Further, unexpected declines in transport or 
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migration costs may deteriorate the situation by transforming a fluctuation into 
permanent agglomeration.  
 The results also suggest that economic integration renders the achievement of 
debt convergence increasingly difficult. This is because the fall of trade or migration 
costs causes an increase in the amplitude of the fluctuation and in the likelihood of 
agglomeration.  
 
7. Debt convergence, debt divergence, and the stability of the Core-Periphery 
configuration.  
The impact of the debt policy on the stability of the Core-Periphery 
configuration can be easily studied by appeal to intuition since the economic 
mechanisms that come into play are the same as those in the previous section. 
Consider an initial situation where both countries have no debt and, initially, country 
H is the Core. The real wage differential ( )1ω  is negative since real wages are higher 
in the core than in the periphery. That makes it possible for country H to have a 
permanently higher level of debt and taxation without destabilising the Core-
Periphery situation. Let cpsb ,  denote the maximum debt ratio differential that can be 
sustained permanently without destabilising the Core-Periphery configuration. Let us 
refer to cpsb ,  as the “sustain debt gap”. Using (6), (7), (9) and the definition of gross 
domestic product I have: ( )( )( )ϕρµ
ω
21
12
, +
−
=cpsb .  
Let us now consider a temporary divergence of debt ratios. The debt ratio differential 
can temporarily be larger than the “sustain debt gap” without country H necessarily 
losing the core. If country H is not to lose the core, the maximum debt divergence 
must be such that Hλ  does not leave the basin of attraction of the core. There is a 
 24 
critical time sz  such that Hλ  at sz  is on the border of the basin of attraction of the 
core. Any intertemporal tax reallocation longer than 0zzs −  brings Hλ  outside the 
basin of attraction of the Core-Periphery configuration. The likelihood that country H 
loses the core increases with the size of the tax cut, with the time length of the 
intertemporal tax reallocation, as well as with a fall in migration and trade costs.   
The last question I ask concerns debt convergence. Assume, for simplicity, 
that country H has a stable debt ratio equal to cpsb , , so that there is no migration (any 
constant level lower than cpsb ,  can be assumed without affecting the results. If country 
H commits to a reduction of the debt ratio to cpsbb ,<  by 1z , expected taxation 
increases and skilled labour starts migrating to country F. After 1z  the Core-Periphery 
configuration is indeed stable because  cpsbb ,<  but Hλ  may have left the basin of 
attraction of the Core-Periphery configuration in the meantime. If that happens, 
country H loses the core permanently.  
The two results of this section can be summarised in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. Temporary debt divergence as well as permanent debt convergence 
may result in the break-up of the core. The break-up of the core is more likely to 
happen if factor markets are more integrated, if the debt divergence is large, or if debt 
reduction is big. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the results in this and the previous section tell us that debt 
convergence may be as destabilising as temporary debt divergence. 
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8. Implications for tax competition. 
In this section I study the consequences of removing the balanced budget 
assumption on the ability of a country to engage in tax competition. In particular, I 
study the ability of a country to defend the core when the assumption of balanced 
budget is removed.  
Assume that country H is the Core (i.e., 1=Hλ ) and that country F always 
keeps a balanced budget. Let τR denote the “residual limit tax”. This is defined as the 
maximum residual per capita tax level that allows country H to keep the core. The 
term “residual” means the level of tax above the level necessary to serve the debt.13 
An example will clarify the matter. Consider the case in which debt is zero in both 
countries. Since country H is the Core, the real wage of skilled labour is larger in 
country H than in country F. The residual limit tax in this case is equal to the real 
wage differential, i.e.: ( ) ( )11 FHR ωωτ −= . Indeed, country H can increase 
permanently its per capita tax level to τR without losing the core. The larger τR the 
stronger is country H’s ability to defend the core in a tax competition game (see 
Baldwin and Krugman, 2004).  
To continue with the example, assume now that both countries have 
permanently constant debt ratios, Hb  and Fb , respectively, and let Hb  > Fb . Then, 
the residual limit tax is:  
( ) ( ) ( )MFMHFHR tt −−−= 11 ωωτ      (15)  
where the term in parentheses represents the permanent tax level differential resulting 
from both countries’ need to service the debt. Since ( ) 0>− MFMH tt , it is clear that the 
                                                 
13 The “residual limit tax” is a concept akin to Baldwin and Krugman (2004) “limit tax”. Indeed the two 
definitions coincide if both countries are in balanced budget. 
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residual limit tax has become smaller with respect to the case of zero debt in both 
countries. Consequently, country H’s ability to defend the core is reduced.  
Consider, finally, a policy of debt reduction whereby country H announces at 
time z0 that the debt ratio will be reduced from Hb  to Hb  at z1 ( Hb  > Hb ). This gives: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

≥∀−−−=
∈∀−−−−
=
1
10
11
,11
zzforttz
zzzforztt
z
MFMHFHR
MFMHFH
R ωωτ
θωω
τ  (16), 
where ( )zθ  is the value at z of the tax increase that will take place at z1. Since 
( )MFMH tt < , it follows that the policy of debt reduction will increase the residual limit 
tax after 1z  but, during the transition period, the residual limit tax declines. Therefore, 
a policy of debt reduction makes a country a stronger player in the tax competition in 
the long run but makes it a weaker player in the short run. We can summarise the 
results of this section in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 4.  Temporary debt divergence temporarily weakens a country’s ability to 
engage in tax competition. A policy of debt convergence makes the debt reducing 
country a stronger player in tax competition in the long run but makes it a weaker 
player during the period of debt reduction.  
 
Equations (15) and (16) show clearly the insight that removing the assumption of 
balanced budget brings to light. The balanced budget tax competition analysis 
neglects the terms ( )MFMH tt −  and ( )zθ . Neglecting the constant term ( )MFMH tt −  
conceals the fact that, other things equal, countries with a permanently larger debt 
ratio are weaker players in international tax competition because their residual limit 
tax is smaller. Neglecting the term ( )zθ  obscures the fact that, other things equal, a 
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core country’s ability to engage in tax competition may be reduced by the need to 
reduce the debt.  
 Proposition 4 highlights a number of interesting implications. Core countries 
with high debt or core countries undergoing a debt reduction should, other things 
equal, be averse to tax competition because their residual limit tax is (temporarily) 
smaller and their ability to defend the core is temporarily reduced. Conversely, small 
countries with low debt should be against tax harmonisation because they have a 
bigger chance of “snatching” the core. A country’s aversion to tax competition may 
change over time; once debt reduction is achieved a country may become more 
favourable to tax competition.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has studied the effects of debt divergence and debt reduction on the 
spatial distribution of output. The analysis departs from the local public finance 
literature by removing the assumption of flow balanced budget. The paper focuses on 
migration motivated by the desire to avoid future tax liabilities.  
An immediate consequence of relaxing the balanced budget assumption is that 
tax harmonisation does not necessarily reduce migration of factors unless it is done in 
an environment where debt ratios are not diverging.  
When agglomeration and dispersion forces are present, debt policies have 
some additional consequences. A policy of temporary divergence of debt ratios 
generates a temporary spatial fluctuation or permanent agglomeration depending on 
whether the divergence of debt ratios has reached a level below or above the “break-
point debt divergence”, respectively (Proposition 1). The likelihood of permanent 
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agglomeration increases with a decline in migration costs and with the magnitude of 
the debt divergence. 
Somewhat surprisingly, a policy of debt convergence may also be 
destabilising. Debt convergence implies an increase in future tax liabilities in the high 
debt country, which induces migration of the mobile factor away from the debt 
reducing country. Debt reduction generates a temporary spatial fluctuation or 
permanent agglomeration depending on whether the magnitude of debt convergence 
reaches a value below or above the “break-point debt convergence”. 
The two results just discussed show that policies that restrain debt divergence 
have indeed a stabilising effect on the spatial distribution of output. Conversely, 
policies of debt convergence, if too ambitious, may have destabilising effects. This 
result suggests a sequencing of economic integration policies when the destabilisation 
of the pre-integration spatial equilibrium is undesirable. Since debt convergence is 
more likely to be destabilising when migration costs are low, it would seem safer that 
debt convergence be achieved before the integration of labour and goods markets 
rather than after.  
 The paper has further shown that the Core-Periphery spatial configuration 
becomes unsustainable when debt divergence is sufficiently large or when the debt 
convergence policy is too ambitious (proposition 3).  
The last section of the paper has shown that countries with high debt are 
weaker players in the tax competition game and that debt reduction makes the core 
country weaker in the short run and stronger in the long run (proposition 4). This 
implies that large countries with high debt should be averse to tax competition, while 
small countries with small debt should be averse to tax harmonisation. 
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Appendix: Perfect foresight. 
With perfect foresight (rational expectation and perfect information) the 
dynamic system becomes:  
))(1(ˆ
1
0 )( zuerr z
zzr −−−= −
•
ϕαωνν       (A.1) 
v
γ
λλ
λ
)1( 11 −−=
•
        (A.2) 
where )(
1
zuz  is a unit step function and νˆ  is the discounted value of ω . It may be 
useful to note that, if we neglect the last term in (A.1), the system is isomorphic to the 
system in Ottaviano (2001) and Baldwin (2001). The main feature of this system is 
that for certain constellations of parameters it exhibits multiple saddle paths.  
The effect of debt divergence on the dynamic system is qualitatively the same 
as illustrated in the text: future tax liabilities, represented by the last term in (A.2), act 
like a forcing function to the system shifting it smoothly between z0 and z1; at z1 the 
system returns to the position it had before z0. The effect of the forcing function is 
simply to shift temporarily all the phase trajectories. The long run equilibrium then 
depends on which saddle path will be reached at z1. This depends crucially on the 
position reached by Hλ  at z1 and on the size of migration costs. Three cases may 
emerge.14  
(1) Large migration cost. In this case there is no overlap of the saddle paths. The 
jumping variable ν  will jump on a saddle path leading to Cλ  if ),()( 1 RLH z λλλ ∈ . 
Instead, if LH z λλ <)( 1  or RH z λλ >)( 1 , then ν  will jump on a saddle path that leads 
to a  Core-Periphery outcome. There is no ambiguity about which long run spatial 
configuration will emerge, it all depends on the value of )( 1zHλ . Only history matters 
                                                 
14 For the analysis of these three representative cases in a model without public debt see Baldwin 
(2001). 
 30 
for large migration costs. In this case, the dynamics of perfect foresight is 
qualitatively equivalent to the dynamics of rational expectations with imperfect 
information. Thus, all propositions in the paper remain valid. 
(2) Intermediate migration cost. In this case there is overlap of saddle paths in a 
neighbourhood of Lλ  and in a neighbourhood of Rλ . The neighbourhoods in which 
there is overlap of saddle paths are known as the “regions of overlap” (Krugman, 
1991b). If )( 1zHλ  is in anyone of these regions, then the long run equilibrium will be 
Cλ  or the Core-Periphery outcome depending on which saddle path is chosen. Instead, 
if )( 1zHλ  is outside these regions, then the long run equilibrium will be Cλ  if 
),()( 1 RLH z λλλ ∈  while it will be the Core-Periphery outcome if LH z λλ <)( 1  or 
RH z λλ >)( 1 . The overlap of saddle paths generates indeterminacy because the same 
“initial condition” )( 1zHλ  may lead to either one of two possible long run spatial 
configurations. Both history and expectations matters in the case of intermediate 
migration costs. Outside the overlap regions all the results of the paper apply 
unchanged. In the overlap regions there is indeterminacy, but this does not invalidate 
the propositions in the paper, it only implies that the “break point debt divergence” 
and the “break point debt convergence” become smaller.  
(3) Small migration cost. The same indeterminacy as in case (2) emerges with the 
difference that the regions of overlap cover the entire set (0,1). Therefore, regardless 
of )( 1zHλ , any one of the long run equilibria may be reached. In terms of the 
implications for the results of the paper this is a limit case for it implies that any debt 
policy (as well as any tax or subsidy policy) is destabilising.  
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